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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL: ADVOCATE FOR HUMAN
NEED IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.*
I could not resist Dean Kelly's invitation to join you on this
important day for the law school. The dedication of any library in our
country is a significant event because libraries are very close to the core
of our freedoms. That is particularly true of law libraries, the
repositories of the record that evidences whether judges have justified
Madison's faith that "independent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of the great rights of
mankind secured under the Constitution."1
The naming of your new library in honor of my colleague Mr.
Justice Thurgood Marshall adds a very special meaning to this occasion,
for it presents a uniquely appropriate opportunity for reflection upon
and assessment of his enormous impact upon American jurisprudence.
Perhaps no advocate of our time has more profoundly altered the course
of our national development. His accomplishments in the school
desegregation litigation "removed our society from its collision course
with the disaster of institutional racism in our public institutions and
committed us to the process of seeking, however haltingly, the elusive
goal of human equality."2 Particularly momentous for our constitutional
jurisprudence, one effect of his work was to change the manner in which
issues of constitutional doctrine are litigated and adjudicated within the
American judicial system. Of course, it has always been true that
important aspects of the most fundamental issues confronting our
democracy ultimately end up in the courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, for judicial determination. It has been correctly observed that
they are the issues upon which our society, consciously or unconsciously,
is most deeply divided. They arouse the deepest emotions. Their
resolution - whatever it be - often writes our future history. The
phenomenon of the last half century is this: constitutional doctrine has
changed from a primary concern with contests between state and federal
authority, and definitions of the powers of the federal executive and
legislative branches, to a distinct emphasis upon the interpretation and
* Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court. This address was delivered at the
dedication of the Thurgood Marshall Law Library, University of Maryland School of Law,
Baltimore, Maryland on October 9, 1980.
1. 1 CONG. DEB. 439 (1834).
2. Ripple, Thurgood Marshall and the Forgotten Legacy of Brown v. Board of
Education, 55 NOTRE DAME L. 471 (1980).
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application of the constitutional limitations upon governmental power
- embodied primarily in the Bill of Rights - that secure the blessings
of liberty for the individual citizen. Thurgood Marshall's advocacy was a
major influence furthering this change.
None of us in the law, whether teacher, practitioner or judge, can
deny that until fifty years ago law often gave cause for complaint that it
had isolated itself from the boiling and difficult currents of life as life is
lived. This was not so before the nineteenth century. When the common
law flourished greatly, law was merged, perhaps too thoroughly, with
the other disciplines and sources of human value. Custom, for example,
was the cherished source of the common law. And what was declared
custom but the accumulated wisdom on social problems of society itself?
The function of law was to formalize and preserve this wisdom - law
certainly could not purport to originate it. However, under the influence
of legal thinkers who dominated legal thought in the nineteenth
century, the vogue of isolating law from the other disciplines, particu-
larly from philosophy that was not expressly legal philosophy, had its
day. This was admittedly a notion of law wholly unconcerned with the
broader extralegal values pursued by society at large or by individuals.
Law lived in a heaven of abstract technicalities and legal forms, and
found its answers to human problems in an aggregation of already
existing rules, or found no answers at all. The substantive problems of
human living were left for adjustment to the psychologists, sociologists,
educators, economists, bankers and other specialists. But Thurgood
Marshall's brand of advocacy taught, and very effectively taught, that
law must be a living process responsive to changing human needs. The
shift must be away from fine-spun technicalities and abstract rules. He
helped persuade us that the vogue for positivism in jurisprudence - the
obsession with what the law is, which leaves no room for a choice
between equally acceptable alternatives - must be replaced by a
jurisprudence that recognizes human beings as the most distinctive and
important feature of the universe which confronts our senses, and that
recognizes the function of law as the historic means of guaranteeing
that pre-eminence. In a scientific age this jurisprudence must ask, in
effect, what is the nature of the universe with which human beings are
confronted: why are human beings important?; what gives them
dignity?; what limits their freedom to do whatever they like?; what are
their essential needs?; whence comes their sense of injustice?
Perhaps you may detect, as I think I do, something of the
philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in this view of jurisprudence. Call it a
resurgence, if you will, of concepts of natural law. But no matter. St.
Thomas, you will remember, was in complete agreement with the Greek
tradition, both in its Aristotelian and Platonic modes, that law must be
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concerned with seeing things whole, that law is but a part of the whole
human situation and draws its validity from its position in the entire
scheme of things. It is folly to think that law, any more than religion or
education, should serve only its own symmetry rather than ends defined
by other disciplines.
Law teaching too has come to emphasize the knowledge and
experience of the other disciplines, in particular those disciplines that
examine or explain the functioning and nature of our society, and the
aspirations and needs of the individuals who compose that society. For
law to be effective, Thurgood Marshall has insisted, it must conform to
the world in which it finds itself. That world is given; law does not make
it. This brand of jurisprudence does not confine men of the law to
lawsuits and courts. It calls for their involvement, personal commitment
and participation in the everyday job of providing skills to assist in the
solution of the extralegal problems of human beings who have been
denied their fair share of the rewards of our society.
The shift from emphasis upon abstract rules has had profound
importance for judicial decision making. A shift in the basic philosophy
of law results in an epoch-making difference in the way a concrete case
is decided. Clearly, cases alone, or even cases together with the Bill of
Rights and the legislative statutes, are not enough; the philosophy of
law which the judge brings to the cases, the Constitution, the Bill of
Rights, and the legislative statutes is equally important. In fact, that
philosophy is all-important since it determines the interpretation that is
put upon the Bill of Rights, the legislative statutes, and the cases. Now I
do not mean that the judge is at large to decide according to his personal
predilections. Cardozo spoke for all judges when he observed that
• . . the range of free activity is relatively small. We may easily
seem to exaggerate it through excess of emphasis . . . complete
freedom - unfettered and undirected - there never is. A thousand
limitations - the product some of statute, some of precedent, some
of tradition or of an immemorial technique - encompasses [sic] and
hedge us even when we think of ourselves as ranging freely and at
large.3
Thurgood Marshall, too,
despite his deep interest in seeing constitutional doctrine reflect the
realities of American life, has recognized, for the most part, the
limitations of the judicial process. His deep feelings for the rights of
3. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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minorities rarely impede his adopting "a reasoned approach to
Constitutional problem-solving." In his address to the Conference
on World Peace Through Law, he noted that the legitimacy of the
judicial process is grounded in the tradition that "unlike the other
branches of government, judges are required to give reasons for
their decisions and to justify those decisions by reference to some
broader principle."4
Yet, for Thurgood Marshall, ultimately in those cases where Constitu-
tion or statute does not clearly decide the case, the judge perforce makes
a value judgment, deciding according to his own intellect, experience
and conscience. For him the complex phenomenon which lawyers know
as law is an always unfinished product. It may be compared to a
tapestry the weaving of which is never done, which repeats many of the
patterns of the past but which constantly adds new patterns and
variations of old patterns.
However, we must keep in mind that although the words of the
Constitution are binding, their application to specific problems rarely
has been easy. The founding fathers knew better than to pin down their
descendants too closely. They sought to write down enduring principles
rather than petty details. Thus it is that the Constitution does not take
the form of a litany of specifics. There are therefore very few cases in
which the constitutional answers are clear, all one way or all the other.
Particularly difficult are the cases that raise conflicts between the
individual and governmental power - the area which has particularly
felt the impact of Thurgood Marshall's advocacy, and which today
primarily absorbs the Court's attention. The conflicts of competing
interests in these cases account for the great bulk of today's cases and
controversies. This proves over and over again that, in a real sense, the
calendar of the Supreme Court at any time is a fairly reliable mirror of
the issues with which our society is struggling. Certainly we may expect
not lesser but greater implication of the various constitutional guaran-
tees designed to protect individual freedom from repressive governmen-
tal action, federal and state. Of course, the federal system's diffusion of
governmental power has the purpose of securing individual freedom.
But this is not all the Constitution provides to secure that end. There
are also explicit provisions to prevent government, state or federal, from
frustrating the great design. It is basic to our way of life that the
ultimate protection of individual freedom is found in judicial enforce-
ment of these constitutional guarantees. The reapportionment cases are
a good illustration. Freedom of a state's citizens to experiment with
4. Ripple, supra note 2, at 483.
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their own economic and social programs is hardly meaningful if the
political processes by which such programs must be achieved are
controlled by only some of the people. The ideal is government of all the
people, by all the people, and for all the people.
Similarly, decisions in the gender and racial discrimination cases
have applied the equal protection clause to prevent states from
discriminating against citizens on the basis of their sex or the color of
their skins. Equal protection of the laws means equal protection today,
whatever else the phrase may have meant in other times. Judges simply
cannot escape their responsibility for the ultimate definition and
application of that constitutional guarantee. In the same area of
responsibility falls, I suggest, the series of decisions extending many of
the guarantees of the first eight amendments to the states. The Bill of
Rights is the primary source of expressed information as to what is
meant by constitutional liberty. Its safeguards secure the climate which
the law of freedom needs in order to exist. It is true that the first ten
amendments were added to the Constitution to operate solely against
federal power. But the fourteenth amendment was added in 1868 in
response to a demand for national protection against abuses of state
power, and it has been the channel for extending the protection of the
safeguards of the Bill of Rights against the states.
The common thread of these holdings - most arrived at after
Thurgood Marshall had helped so prodigiously to awaken the Court to
the reality that the protections were honored not by their enforcement
but by their neglect - had been the conclusion that the enforcement of
the constitutional guarantees is essential to the preservation and
furtherance of our free society. Some of these decisions have indeed
aroused concern, particularly those that affect the processes of state
criminal prosecutions. It cannot be denied that some decisions do
restrict the latitude of choice open to the states in this area. But that is
a price which must be paid for guarantees deemed to have a place
among those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions. The genius of the
Constitution resides not in any static meaning that it had in a world
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to
cope with current problems and current needs.
We have learned that what our constitutional fundamentals meant
to the wisdom of other times cannot be their measure to the vision of
our time. Our descendants will learn that what those fundamentals
mean for us cannot be the measure to the vision of their time. The
constant for Americans, for our ancestors, for ourselves, and we hope for
future generations, is our commitment to the constitutional ideal of
[VOL. 40
TRIBUTE TO JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
libertarian dignity protected through law. Crises in prospect are
creating, and will create, more and more threats to the achievement of
that ideal - more and more collisions of the individual with his
government. The need for judicial vigilance in the service of that ideal
will not lessen. It will remain the business of judges to protect
fundamental constitutional rights which will be threatened in ways not
possibly envisoned by the Framers. Justices yet to sit, like their
predecessors, are destined to labor earnestly in that endeavor - we
hope with wisdom - to reconcile the complex realities of their times
with the principles which mark a free people. As the nation moves ever
forward towards its goals of liberty and freedom, and as new and
different constitutional stresses and strains emerge, the role of the
courts will be ever the same - to justify, I repeat, Madison's faith that
"independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of constitutional rights."5 Judges, like other
human beings responsible for other human institutions, are of course on
the dubious waves of error tossed. Yet, as has been said, the soul of a
government of laws is the judicial function, and that function can only
exist if adjudication is understood by our people to be, as it is, the
essentially disinterested, rational and deliberate element of our society.
This library houses Thurgood Marshall's monumental contributions
to the jurisprudence that has breathed new life into the constitutional
protections for all individuals, including the disadvantaged, the poor,
the oppressed minorities. That contribution is embedded in decisions of
cases in which he prevailed as advocate and in decisions of cases in
which his role was that of judge and justice.
As advocate, he argued alone in the Supreme Court for the NAACP
Legal Defense and Education Fund the fourteen trail-blazing cases that
started this nation on the road to the end of racial discrimination. He
was on the prevailing side in all but three of those cases. He also
participated on the brief in another fourteen significant racial discri-
mination cases whose decisions reinforced the same progress to that
end.
I so well remember that my former colleagues, Hugo Black and
Felix Frankfurter, who did not often agree, were in complete agreement
that the submissions of Thurgood Marshall as advocate were among the
best presented to the Court in their time.
As Solicitor General of the United States Thurgood Marshall
personally argued eighteen cases and prevailed in fourteen. The range
of issues was extraordinarily wide and his success again attested to his
high skill in advocacy. The high quality of his advocacy richly earned
5. 1 CONG. DEB. 439 (1834).
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him his reputation as one of the great advocates in the history of the
Court.
Only recently I read this: because of the sensitive and skilled way
that Thurgood Marshall structured the desegregation litigation
it is now clear that the school desegregation cases have had a very
great influence on the manner in which American courts perform
their task. Consequently, this impact will significantly affect the
future ability of other Americans to find the same protection in the
law that Brown provided for this now-famous nine-year-old girl
from Topeka, Kansas. 6
In a similar vein, then Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, a colleague of
Justice Marshall on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
recalled:
My most abiding memory of Thurgood on this court was his ability
to infuse his judicial product with the elements of the advocate's
craft. As an attorney Thurgood stressed "the human side" of the
case. As a judge he wrote for the people. (And would not we all be
enriched if more judges exhibited this concern for the consumer?)
He possessed an instinct for the critical fact, the gut issue, born of
his exquisite sense of the practical. This gift was often cloaked in a
witty aside: "There's a very practical way to find out whether a
confession has been coerced: ask, how big was the cop?" But behind
this jovial veneer is a precise and brilliant legal tactician who, to
quote his 1966 Law Day speech in Miami, was able "to shake free of
the 19th century moorings and view the law not as a set of abstract
and socially unrelated commands of the sovereign, but as an
effective instrument of social policy." Thurgood was able to sear the
nation's conscience and move hearts formerly strangled by hoary
intransigence. And, because of him, we are all more free. 7
And I can personally attest that, as has been said, on the Supreme
Court Marshall seems to be consciously attempting to assist his
brethren in understanding those facets of American life upon which
their decisions impact but about which some have little first hand
knowledge. In United States v. Kras,8 for example, the Court held that
6. Ripple, supra note 2, at 472.
7. Kaufman, Thurgood Marshall: A Tribute, 6 BLACK L. J. 23, 25 (1978).
8. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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an indigent could be required to pay a fee to file a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. Dissenting, Justice Marshall wrote:
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of
less than $2 are no burden. But no one who has had close contact
with poor people can fail to understand how close to the margin of
survival many of them are. A sudden illness, for example, may
destroy whatever savings they may have accumulated, and by
eliminating a sense of security may destroy the incentive to save in
the future. A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for them, not a
routine purchase but a luxury indulged in only rarely. The
desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, which the majority
seems to believe is an almost weekly activity. They have more
important things to do with what little money they have - like
attempting to provide some comforts for a gravely ill child, as Kras
must do.
It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the
Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation of
the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions about
how people live.9
Thurgood Marshall as Supreme Court Justice continues to give bench
and bar a further lesson in the art of making the constitutional decision
- making process reflective of societal values.
Marshall remains very much the same person he was as a
litigator. He retains an ability to gauge instinctively the pragmatic
limits of judicial power. He insists that constitutional doctrine be
based on reality. This daily insistence on attention to the basics of
constitutional litigation makes him a model for those who now
bring to the courts the causes of the unborn, the physically
handicapped, the mentally ill and others for whom sterile constitu-
tional analysis of the plessy variety remains a formidable barrier. 10
If his judicial philosophy insists that law be gauged to current realities
confronting people, it is also a response to the lessons of the past.
The university and the law school truly honor themselves in
dedicating this magnificent library in honor of a great American.
9. Id. at 460.
10. Ripple, supra note 2, at 484.
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THURGOOD MARSHALL: A TRIBUTE
J. SKELLY WRIGHT*
Thurgood Marshall played an important role in my judicial
education. When I was appointed to the federal bench in Louisiana in
1949, I was only dimly aware of the attacks being mounted against the
edifice of segregation. Although I believed that segregation was wrong, I
had little sense of the role the courts might play in confronting this
injustice. But when Thurgood Marshall, who was then general counsel
for the NAACP, appeared in my courtroom to try the Louisiana State
University Law School' case, my education began. Pursuant to state
law, Louisiana maintained L.S.U. Law School for whites, and Southern
University Law School for blacks. Brown v. Board of Education2 had not
yet been decided, so the case was being tried under the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson? Marshall soon convinced me that
Southern University was not only separate from, but also unequal to,
L.S.U. Law School. I crossed the Rubicon when I decided that case.
I vividly remember Marshall's cross-examination of one of the
deans of Southern Law School. Earlier in the trial, counsel for the State
had emphasized that Southern Law School, unlike L.S.U. Law School,
was air-conditioned, clearly an advantage in sultry Louisiana. Marshall
asked the Dean to describe in detail the building in which Southern was
housed. The Dean testified that it was a large wooden frame structure
with five floors housing several parts of the University, and that the
Law School was on the fifth floor. Marshall then asked the witness to
describe what was on each of the other floors, which he did. Marshall
then asked the witness whether each of the first four floors was
air-conditioned like the fifth. The answer as to each floor was "No."
Feigning surprise at the Dean's answers, Marshall then asked the
witness what was immediately above the fifth floor. His answer: "The
roof." Marshall then suggested to the Dean that the Law School was
really housed in the attic of the building. The Dean readily agreed,
saying, "That's why it is air-conditioned."
Marshall's cross-examination of the Southern Law School dean was
typical of his courtroom performances: he was always straight-forward,
good-humored, and incisive. During my years as a district judge, I
encountered few lawyers as skilled in their craft. He had an uncanny
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. Wilson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 92 F. Supp. 986 (1950).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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ability to identify the crucial facts in a case, and to describe legal issues
in clear, commonsense terms. And he was able to do this in a way that
conveyed, often quite dramatically, the realities of segregation - how it
affected the daily lives of black Americans. His efforts in the Law School
case, as well as in the other cases he tried in my courtroom, helped
persuade me that if the law did not prohibit racial discrimination, then
the law was wrong. Two years after the Louisiana law school case the
Supreme Court issued its historic decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.
I was not the only judge who was introduced to the harsh realities
of racism by Thurgood Marshall. As the NAACP's general counsel, he
orchestrated the long campaign to end segregation in the schools. That
campaign was brilliant, a masterpiece of litigation strategy. Beginning
with an attack on segregation in professional schools, then moving on to
confront segregation in elementary schools, Marshall carefully laid the
foundation for reversal of Plessy v. Ferguson. Apparently tireless, he
traveled among dozens of states, discussing tactics with local lawyers,
encouraging frightened parents, trying cases. Marshall lost many of
these preliminary skirmishes. But, ultimately, he won the war. As
counsel in Brown v. Board of Education, he convinced the Supreme
Court that "separate but equal" could never really be equal, and that
segregated education must end.
The significance of Marshall's victory in Brown v. Board of
Education cannot be overstated. As a matter of constitutional law,
Brown may be the most important decision of our time. It breathed new
life into the equal protection clause, and demonstrated to lawyers and
judges that the law could be a powerful tool for social reform. But by
helping to secure a victory in Brown, Marshall did more than contribute
to the development of constitutional jurisprudence. The message of
Brown, that segregation of public institutions must end, affected the
lives of all Americans. We were reminded that our nation had its origin
in a commitment to individual equality. And we learned that, because of
that commitment, racism would no longer be tolerated. It is true that
some have been less receptive to this lesson than others; discrimination
continues to flourish. But after Brown, even diehard segregationists
must realize thay are battling against the force of law.
The list of Thurgood Marshall's achievements does not end with his
victory in Brown. It is difficult to imagine a more spectacular legal
career. After Brown was decided, Marshall spent several years fighting
to ensure that its mandate was enforced. In 1961 he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Later, he
became Solicitor General under President Johnson. Finally, in 1967, he
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moved to the Supreme Court. Throughout, he has remained firm in his
belief that the law, used effectively, can achieve a more just society.
If, as I have always believed, one measure of a judge's work is his
compassion, then Thurgood Marshall is a great judge. His judicial
product reflects not only a fine legal mind, but the same sensitivity to
human needs and social realities that characterized his work for the
NAACP. He is a steadfast opponent of legal abstractions that fail to
recognize the facts of life: that the poor really do live on the brink of
financial disaster, that the poor as defendants in criminal cases do not
receive equal justice with the rich, that minorities really do lack power,
that, considering the influence of money in the political process, the one
man-one vote principle on which this democracy was founded is a pious
fraud. Because he is only one of nine Justices, and because he wants to
push the law further than some of the other Justices would like it to go,
he often speaks in concurrence or dissent. Even so, his insistence that
the Court consider the real impact of its decisions has had a powerful
and beneficial impact on the work of that institution.
Thurgood Marshall, as much as any man of our time, has served the
nation. Throughout his career, as a lawyer and as a judge, he has acted
to ensure that law serves the ends of justice and goodness. I am certain
he would say that he has not been as successful as he would like. But
the fact remains that he has achieved at least a large part of what he
set out to achieve. As a result, he has helped make our society a better,
more decent, place in which to live.
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A VISION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OWEN M. FIss*
Growing up is a process of having one's heroes rendered less
inspiring. For me, Thurgood Marshall was the exception.
A little over twenty-five years ago I made the familiar high school
trip to Washington, D.C. My classmates and I took in all the
monuments. We even managed to catch a few minutes of the Supreme
Court in session. We entered in the middle of an oral argument, and
though we did not fully understand what was transpiring in the
courtroom, no one could miss the sense of drama. A tall black lawyer
was addressing the Court, and all eyes - set in a sea of white - were
fixed on him.
The lawyer spoke with a very special eloquence. He was dignified
and proper, but his words were accessible to all. The formalisms that so
often mask the law and make it forbidding were gone. The case was put
in simple, clear, powerful words. These words were uttered with
patience, with a steel, almost icy serenity, yet beneath them was an
urgency, a longing, that could not help but move the Justices and the
audience. The moment was electrifying - it infused me with a spirit
and determination that helped shape my life, it captured the nation.
Afterward I learned that the case was called Brown v. Board of
Education and the lawyer Thurgood Marshall.
A decade later we met again, this time on a somewhat more direct
basis. The lawyer had recently become a judge, of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, and I became his law clerk. I was given a chance
that was both extraordinary and risky, to work for a hero of my youth
- though, until now, I never dared to tell him how much he meant to
me. He is not that kind of person - he is open, always joking, and
warm, but with little tolerance for explicit displays of sentiment
("knucklehead" is his favorite word of endearment).
The qualities I saw in the courtroom in the 1950s filled his
chambers in the 1960s, and there was more. There were his stories -
that conveyed to me the terror, the sacrifice, and, once in a while, even
the joy of being a civil rights lawyer in the 1930s and 1940s, still a time
of the most crude and brutal racism. There were the daring moments on
the bench - when he "overruled" some Supreme Court precedents,
those, he said, of an earlier age and likely to be repudiated by the
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW, 1978. Adopted by permis-
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Supreme Court itself whenever it got around to the task;' or when he
questioned a decision of an even higher authority for the Second Circuit
- L. Hand.2 There were also our disagreements over the cases -
extraordinary arguments, in which his vision of the Constitution and
my recently acquired education at the Harvard Law School - a place
then consumed by Wechsler's "neutral principles" - did not exactly
mesh. In time I learned, I learned a lot, about the law and about him.
Thurgood Marshall has probably had the most stunning legal
career of the twentieth century - the lawyer in Brown, a turning point
in American jurisprudence; a judge of the Second Circuit; later the
Solicitor General of the United States; and still later a Supreme Court
justice. Clearly he was on the side of history (though that was not
apparent to all - his grandmother greeted his decision to study law
with an insistence that he learn to cook, so that he could be sure of a
job). But there was a cause more personal to the man, a vision of
American society that sees law as the central instrument of reform and
protection of human rights as the highest purpose of the Constitution.
This was the vision that led him to the NAACP and sustained him
through the harassment and defeats of his career. This was the vision
that found expression in his work as a civil rights lawyer and also as a
judge.
Thurgood Marshall's commitment to that vision was not shared by
all his colleagues on the Second Circuit. Now and then a civil rights
case came before that court in the 1964-65 term, the year of my
clerkship, and the judge took his stand - in dissent.3 A more frequent
1. United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 861-63 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied sub nom. Mancusi v. Hetenyi, 383 U.S. 913 (1966) (criticizing Kring v. Missouri,
107 U.S. 221 (1882), and Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910)). Hentenyi was cited
approvingly by Justice Fortas in his dissent in Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76, 81-82
(1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting); and Brantley was explicitly overruled in Price v. Georgia,
398 U.S. 323, 330 (1970).
2. See In re Sherman Plastering Corp., 346 F.2d 492, 495-9.6 (2d Cir. 1965) (set-off
in bankruptcy reorganization; disapproving of In re Neaderthal, 225 F. 38 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915)); United States ex rel. Martinez-Angosto v. Mason, 344 F.2d
673, 686-88 (2d Cir. 1965) (procedural protections for deportation of sailors jumping
foreign ships; disapproving of United States ex rel. Perez-Varella v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 723,
725 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961)); Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales &
Transp. Co., 340 F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1965) (duty of seaworthiness; questioning
distinction posed by Judge Hand in Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956)).
3. People v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 275 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977
(1965) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that demonstrators who disrupted traffic to N.Y.
World's Fair should be given opportunity to amend removal petitions and have district
court conduct full hearings); Ephraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 341 F.2d 815, 820 (2d Cir.
1965) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a bus company that picked up passengers in
the New York Port Authority should be held liable for damages suffered by a black woman
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area of disagreement centered on the rights of the individual in the
criminal process - Mapp v. Ohio,4 Gideon v. Wainwright,5 Fay v. Noia,6
and Escobedo v. Illinois7 (the stepping stone to Miranda v. Arizona).8
Some of the judges on the Second Circuit, particularly those in positions
of leadership in the bar and the academy, received these decisions of the
Warren Court only in the most grudging fashion. Thurgood Marshall,
on the other hand, insisted that these decisions be taken at their full
value - not in obedience to a higher authority, but because they
embodied the right principles of our constitutional order. He took these
stands repeatedly, and courageously, at some discomfort - was no fun
for a new judge, one whose appointment took the Senate almost a year
to confirm, one with no ties to Wall Street, then the spiritual center of
the Second Circuit, repeatedly to raise his voice in protest, against the
prominent, the established, the recognized. He spoke on behalf of the
Supreme Court, true, but in the early 1960s that institution was at the
center of controversy and criticism - it needed support and had little to
confer. As it turned out, history was once again on Thurgood Marshall's
side - he moved on to be Solicitor General at the end of the year, giving
up the tenure of his judgeship because he too could not say "no" to LBJ.
Not long ago I took my daughters to Washington, D.C. We made a
stop at the Supreme Court, and I introduced them to Thurgood
Marshall, not in the courtroom, but now in his chambers. He was his
usual jovial self, yet beneath the surface, beneath the joking and the
stories (which were retold for my daughters), one could see the grandeur
of the man who had stood in the courtroom twenty-five years ago, with
that same sense of struggle and determination, now resisting the efforts
of the Burger Court to undo many achievements of Brown and the
Warren Court era. One could also see, and marvel at, his continued
capacity and effort to recharge a new generation, even though the
present state of the law could not have been for him a source of
satisfaction or optimism - so much that he stands for is in jeopardy.
That is why it is so fitting to honor Thurgood Marshall at this time.
Not because we are at another anniversary - he could not care less
about things like that (it pained him to sit for the sculpture Baltimore
in an incident that occurred in Georgia, at the instigation of the driver, when she refused
to change her seat, despite the fact that the incident occurred on the bus of a connecting
carrier).
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
7. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
404 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 40
erected for him, and not simply because it is so near the one the city
erected for its other justice, Taney). Rather, because we are at a time
when there is a need to celebrate the personal qualities that Thurgood
Marshall exemplifies - courage sustained by a vision of the centrality
of human rights to our constitutional order. In honoring him we express
the hope that his vision will once again be triumphant. We renew his
spirit and ours, and thus do what we can to make certain that Thurgood
Marshall will once again be on the side of history.
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THURGOOD MARSHALL: LAWYER AND JUSTICE
Louis H. POLLAK*
I.
De Tocqueville's most celebrated observation about the role of law
in the life of the new republic - that it was customary for American
lawyers to bring great issues of public policy to court - was not a report
of a new phenomenon: In 1734, long before Americans had become a
nation, Philadelphia's Andrew Hamilton had journeyed to New York to
conduct the successful defense of John Peter Zenger, printer-publisher of
the New York Weekly Journal, against charges of seditious libel, and
had thereby "first established in English and American law the freedom
of the press."' By the mid-1830's, when de Tocqueville's great work was
published, the process which had been tentative and sporadic in the
eighteenth century was a major ingredient of the American system of
government. Thus, Daniel Webster, the archetypical American lawyer,
had already brought to the Supreme Court the momentous public issues
embodied in The Dartmouth College Case,2 McCulloch v. Maryland,3
Gibbons v. Ogden,4 and Charles River Bridge,5 and he was to follow
these with, inter alia, Swift v. Tyson,6 Vidal v. Philadelphia [the Girard
Case],7 and Luther v. Borden.s
Since Webster's death, no courtroom lawyer has attained his
unchallenged dominion. 9 But two later masters of the courtroom -
* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
1. Inscription in the garden in Independence Mall which the American Bar
Association dedicated to Andrew Hamilton's memory in 1976, as part of the bicentennial
exercises.
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
4. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
5. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
6. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (argued by Webster in 1840, later resubmitted on briefs
by other counsel).
7. 43 U.S. (2 How). 127 (1844).
8. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
9. Able as he was, Webster may have been an iota less transcendent an advocate
than he believed himself to be: After the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, in which he and
Attorney General William Wirt were victorious counsel, Webster observed that "The
opinion of the Court, as rendered by the Chief Justice, was little else than a recital of my
argument. The Chief Justice told me that he had little to do but to repeat that argument,
as that covered the whole ground. And, which was a little curious, he never referred to the
fact that Mr. Wirt had made an argument. He did not speak of it once. . . That was very
singular. It was an accident, I think - Mr. Wirt was a great lawyer, and a great man. But
sometimes a man gets a kink and doesn't hit right. That was one of the occasions. But that
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while not on a par with Webster - achieved a deserved public
preeminence not accorded any other member of the bar. One was
Clarence Darrow. The other was and is Thurgood Marshall.
The most significant of Clarence Darrow's extraordinary roster of
cases was his defense of a Tennessee school teacher, John T. Scopes,
against the charge that he had violated Tennessee law by teaching
about evolution. The prosecution of Scopes, in the small town of Dayton
in July of 1925, was at the time widely regarded as "The World's Most
Famous Court Trial."10 Darrow's principal adversary was the foremost
orator of his time - a former Secretary of State and Democratic
Presidential nominee - William Jennings Bryan.
Thurgood Marshall's greatest triumph - assuredly the most
important litigation of any kind in any court since the Civil War - was
Brown v. Board of Education.1 1 Marshall's principal adversary was the
foremost appellate lawyer of his time - a former Ambassador to the
Court of St. James and Democratic Presidential nominee - John W.
Davis.
One suspects that neither Bryan nor Davis really understood -
that is to say, fully understood in historic and philosophic terms - the
lawsuit he had in charge. 12 Yet Bryan won, 13 whereas Davis, of course,
was nothing against Mr. Wirt." 1 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History
610-11 (1922). Another view of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden is
that Webster overstated his own contribution, understated Wirt's and ignored the
independent contribution of the Chief Justice.
10. This was the title of the verbatim record, commercially published by the National
Book Company. The public thronged the trial. Among the huge cohort of journalists
covering this event which commanded international interest were such veterans as
Mencken and such neophytes as Adlai Stevenson.
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); see also 349 U.S.
294 (1954).
Brown v. Board of Education is the celebrated caption for four distinct lawsuits -
each testing a state school segregation statute (the four states were Delaware, Kansas,
Virginia and South Carolina) - consolidated in the Supreme Court for argument in 1952,
reargument in 1953, and further argument as to remedy in 1954. Marshall was
commander-in-chief of plaintiffs' counsel in all four lawsuits, but of course the burden of
arguing these consolidated appeals was shared with able co-counsel. In the crucial 1953
reargument, Marshall and Spottswood W. Robinson, III (now Chief Judge Robinson of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) shared the arguments in Briggs v. Elliott,
from South Carolina, and Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, from
Virginia.
12. At the 1952 argument, Davis defended the South Carolina school segregation
statute, and at the 1953 reargument, Davis' brief was extended to cover the Virginia
statute as well, putting him in direct confrontation, as to both appeals, with Marshall and
Spottswood W. Robinson, III. See note 11 supra. It seems a fair surmise that the most
influential moving spirit behind Davis' retainer was the Governor of South Carolina,
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lost. But fuller understanding would not have availed Davis. To what
Marshall said in his Supreme Court peroration there was no response:
They can't take race out of this case. From the day this case
was filed until this moment, nobody has in any form or fashion,
despite the fact I made it clear in the opening argument that I was
relying on it, done anything to distinguish this statute from the
Black Codes, which they must admit, because nobody can dispute,
say anything anybody wants to say, one way or the other, the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to deprive the states of power
to enforce Black Codes or anything else like it.
We charge that they are Black Codes. They obviously are Black
Codes if you read them. They haven't denied that they are Black
Codes, so if the Court wants to very narrowly decide this case, they
can decide it on that point.
So whichever way it is done, the only way that this Court can
decide this case in opposition to our position, is that there must be
James F. Byrnes - former Senator, "Assistant President", Secretary of State, and Justice
of the Supreme Court.
Richard Kluger, in Simple Justice, has described the closing minutes of Davis' 1953
reargument, which was to be his last appearance ever in the Supreme Court:
As he I Davis] neared the end of his argument, the drain on him became apparent
to Chief Justice Warren, who looked down on the great old advocate from the distance
of just a few feet. "Mr. Davis was quite emotional," Warren recalled later. "In fact, he
seemed to me to break down a few times during the hearing." With deep conviction,
Davis wound up pleading for the integrity of states' rights and the good intentions of
his client. "Your honors do not sit, and cannot sit, as a glorified board of education for
the state of South Carolina or any other state," he declared. South Carolina had not
come before the Court "as Thad Stevens would have wished - in sack cloth and ashes
... .It is confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality for all of its
children of whatever race or color," as it had done in equalizing the schools of
Clarendon County. So much had been gained in race relations, he said, adding,
I am reminded - and I hope it won't be treated as a reflection on anybody - of
Aesop's fable of the dog and the meat: The dog, with a fine piece of meat in his
mouth, crossed a bridge and saw [his] shadow in the stream and plunged in for it
and lost both substance and shadow.
Here is equal education, not promised, not prophesied, but present. Shall it be
thrown away on some fancied question of racial prestige?
Thurgood Marshall remembered seeing tears on the cheeks of John W. Davis as
he turned away from the Court for the final time in his life. Attorney General Lindsay
Almond of Virginia, sitting at the counsel table with him, recalls that Davis was
emotionally overwrought at the end. He had stated the South's case as effectively as it
could be done. But his day was past. "He thought the case could be viewed as a strictly
legal matter," reflects Robert Figg, who had argued Briggs in Charleston. "I don't
think he ever realized the swirl of social and political events affecting it."
R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 672-73 (1975).
13. See Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), upholding the
anti-evolution statute but setting aside Scopes' conviction on other grounds. The
Tennessee Supreme Court's pronouncement that the teaching of evolution could be
proscribed by law retained some modest vitality until Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968).
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some reason which gives the state the right to make a classification
that they can make in regard to nothing else in regard to Negroes,
and we submit the only way to arrive at this decision is to find that
for some reason Negroes are inferior to all other human beings.
Nobody will stand in the Court and urge that, and in order to
arrive at the decision that they want us to arrive at, there would
have to be some recognition of a reason why of all of the
multitudinous groups of people in this country you have to single
out Negroes and give them this separate treatment.
It can't be because of slavery in the past, because there are very
few groups in this country that haven't had slavery some place back
in the history of their groups. It can't be color because there are
Negroes as white as the drifted snow, with blue eyes, and they are
just as segregated as the colored man.
The only thing can be is an inherent determination that the
people who were formerly in slavery, regardless of anything else,
shall be kept as near that stage as is possible, and now is the time,
we submit, that this Court should make it clear that this is not
what our Constitution stands for.' 4
Agreeing, the Court restored the nation's - and the world's - faith in
the sanctity and supremacy of the principles of equality and liberty
protected by the Constitution.
II.
Of the handful of larger-than-life courtroom lawyers from Webster
onward, only Thurgood Marshall has become a Justice of the Supreme
Court. As a Justice, he has been no less vigilant than as a lawyer in
policing assertions of state interest that appear to be in tension with the
national liberties enshrined in the Constitution. Not infrequently, a
majority of the Court has found a saving measure of legitimacy in state
policies which are for Justice Marshall masks for unredeemed parochial-
ism. And occasionally (occasions which the Justice has been quick to
identify) there has been substantial state court precedent - sometimes
rooted in state constitutions as well as, or in lieu of, the federal
Constitution - for Justice Marshall's dissenting view of the constraints
constitutional norms put on state policy. Such was the case in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez, where the majority of
the Court found no constitutional infirmity in "substantial interdistrict
disparities in [Texas public] school expenditures," which disparities
were chiefly a function of large variations in the property-tax base from
14. LEON FRIEDMAN, ARGUMENT 239-40 (1969).
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district to district. Justice Marshall was at pains to emphasize that the
"majority's decision represents an abrupt departure from the main-
stream of state and federal court decisions..."15
Full-circle vindication of Justice Marshall's neo-Brandeisian enthu-
siasm for forward-looking state court constitutional adjudication came a
year ago in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.16 There the Court
reviewed a California Supreme Court decision which interpreted the
free speech-and-assembly provisions of the California Constitution as
prohibiting proprietors of a shopping center from interfering with high
school students who gathered in a courtyard of the shopping center to
engage in peaceful solicitation of signatures on petitions addressed to
the President and Congress and expressing opposition to a United
Nations resolution. In Pruneyard the California Supreme Court had
read its own constitution in much the same way that the United States
Supreme Court, through Justice Marshall, had in 1968 read the First
Amendment in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza.17 But in decisions handed down in 197218 and 197619 - between
Logan Valley and Pruneyard - the United States Supreme Court had
jettisoned Logan Valley. So the question posed in Pruneyard was
whether California's fashioning of a Logan Valley-like rule of
California constitutional law constituted a curtailment of the property
rights of the shopping-center proprietors forbidden by the due process
and/or just compensation clauses of the federal Constitution. That
question was properly answered in the negative, in Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court. Joining in the judgment and opinion of the Court,
Justice Marshall filed a concurrence in which he observed:
In the litigation now before the Court, the Supreme Court of
California construed the California Constitution to protect precisely
those rights of communication and expression that were at stake in
Logan Valley, Lloyd, and Hudgens. The California court concluded
that its state "constitution broadly proclaims speech and petition
rights. Shopping centers to which the public is invited can provide
an essential and invaluable forum for exercising those rights." 23
Cal. 3d 899, 910, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860, 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979).
Like the Court in Logan Valley, the California court found that
access to shopping centers was crucial to the exercise of rights of
free expression. And like the Court in Logan Valley, the California
15. 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973).
16. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
17. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
18. Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
19. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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court rejected the suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment
barred the intrusion on the property rights of the shopping center
owners. I applaud the court's decision, which is a part of a very
healthy trend of affording state constitutional provisions a more
expansive interpretation than this Court has given to the Federal
Constitution. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).20
III.
Lawyer Marshall restored the supremacy and integrity of the
democratic principles which are at the core of the federal Constitution.
Justice Marshall has labored long and effectively to strengthen these
principles. In the face of occasional setbacks, Justice Marshall has
recognized that a proper line of retreat may lead to terrain he would not
in his lawyer years have expected to find hospitable - the constitutions
of the several states.2 ' It is a recognition that attests to the vision and
enterprise of the Justice - and to the health of our federalism.2 2
20. 447 U.S. at 79.
21. As is suggested by Justice Marshall's laconic Pruneyard citation to "Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977),"
Justice Marshall's awareness of broader constitutional terrain than that his own Court
patrols draws, as it should, on the comparable insights of Justice Brennan, who is on so
many issues Justice Marshall's strong partner in constitutional principle.
22. The salutary renascence of state constitutional law derives from the increasingly
widespread recognition by state courts that they occupy a genuinely dual role: (1) all state
courts are obliged - by the supremacy clause and as surrogates of the United States
Supreme Court - to enforce the guarantees contained in the federal Constitution and
federal statutes; (2) each state court system is the principal and ultimate architect and
custodian of that state's own homegrown constitutional jurisprudence. Responsible
exercise by a state court of that dual responsibility has methodological implications which
have been thoughtfully explicated in recent opinions of the Oregon Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (1981); State v. Scharf, 605 P.2d 690 (1980). Justice
Linde of that court has put the matter well:
The proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law,
before reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for the sake either
of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed
under the federal constitution when the claim before the court is fully met by state
law.
Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126.
Pursuit of the analytic sequence described by Justice Linde is proper not only because
a state constitutional guarantee closely comparable in wording to a federal constitutional
guarantee may be accorded a different (and broader) scope, but also because, as Sterling v.
Cupp itself illustrates, state constitutions frequently include detailed entitlements which
have no analogue in the federal Constitution.
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THURGOOD MARSHALL AS A LAWYER:
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SCHOOL SEGREGATION,
1945-1950*
MARK V. TUSHNET**
We all have some idea of the qualities a great judge has: wisdom, a
sense of what is proper in the circumstances, an ability to explain how
the law as it is supports a just result. When we think about great
lawyers, though, the image is much more blurred. Wisdom and
judgment matter, of course, but the lawyer's audience is narrower than
the judge's, and so ability to communicate may be a less important
quality of greatness in lawyers. Then too lawyers must directly
conciliate, and the ability to persuade an adversary that a dispute
should be settled on favorable terms, though it shares something with
the ability to write a persuasive opinion, invokes skills that may not
readily be captured on paper. Yet to make the ability to persuade one's
adversaries a crucial element of greatness in lawyering would consign
those whose adversaries are rigid in their positions to the second rank.
Thurgood Marshall was a great lawyer. His considerable courtroom
skills, though they were not irrelevant to his greatness, were secondary.
Those who know him understand his wisdom, the superb quality of his
judgments about life and law. As general counsel in the NAACP's
campaign against school segregation, he assembled a staff and a
"kitchen cabinet" which presented him with the ingenious and innova-
tive arguments that the litigation needed. Marshall then selected,
almost always correctly and without hesitation, the set of arguments
that would work best. But Marshall had another quality that contri-
buted to - indeed, may have been the prerequisite to - his greatness.
He was a great politician. Faced with conflicting demands from disparate
elements in his constituency, Marshall was able to unite the constituen-
cy behind a program with which many had initially disagreed.
Marshall used his political skills with great effect between 1945
and 1950 in the struggle against school segregation.1 Prior to 1945 the
NAACP had been involved in two kinds of cases. Some sought to
desegregate Southern graduate and professional schools. Others sought
*0 Mark V. Tushnet, 1981.
** Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison; A.B., Harvard University,
1967; J.D., M.A., Yale University, 1971.
1. This article is based on research supported by grants from the Rockefeller
Foundation's program of Fellowships in the Humanities, the Legal History Project of the
American Bar Foundation, and the Research Committee of the Graduate School of the
University of Wisconsin-Madison.
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to equalize the salaries of black and white teachers. With but a few
exceptions, the NAACP had not been involved in efforts to desegregate
elementary or secondary schools. Yet if segregation was to be destroyed
- and that was always the NAACP's goal - something had to be done
about its foundations in the early education of Southern children. The
NAACP could pursue either of two paths. Without directly challenging
the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,2 the NAACP
could seek to equalize the expenditures on black and white schools. Or it
could mount a direct attack on Plessy, seeking to force Southern school
boards to educate black and white children in the same classrooms. Both
paths led, it was hoped, to the same end, for the NAACP lawyers
believed that. equalization would be so costly as to make segregation a
fiscally intolerable policy. But important strategic consequences flowed
from the choice between equalization and the direct attack. Between
1945 and 1950 Marshall, with great political skill, laid the groundwork
within the NAACP for the direct attack.
The issue of dealing with elementary and secondary schools did not
come into focus until the mid-1940's, though the NAACP had been
litigating desegregation cases since the mid-1930's. The reasons lie in
the manner in which the NAACP had succeeded with its early cases. In
late 1946 Robert Carter, a staff attorney, drafted a speech for Walter
White, the NAACP's executive secretary, in which he suggested that
White say, "The teachers' salary fight is now about over."3 Equalization
had occurred in many of the South's larger cities. But Southern school
boards had developed strategies of evasion that were likely to be
difficult to overcome.4 Even where blatantly discriminatory salary
schedules remained in effect, the localities were likely to be small, and
the return on the NAACP's efforts would probably not have warranted a
county-by-county mopping up operation. By 1945, then, a new direction
for litigation below the university level had to be found if the NAACP
was to sustain its pressure on segregated education on every level. But
that direction could have been towards equalization of facilities or
towards desegregation directly.
The national staff was reluctant to pursue an equalization strategy
for both ideological and organizational reasons. The former were
developed in detail in a series of increasingly bitter letters between
Marshall and Carter Wesley. Wesley was an attorney and editor of an
important black newspaper published in Houston. He was described as
militant and as having strong will power and, as the exchange with
Marshall makes clear, Wesley was not an easy person to get along with.
The dispute in 1946 and 1947 over desegregation strategy revived an
earlier one over strategy in challenging the Texas white primary; in
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both, Wesley was concerned with questions of control by the national
office as well as with questions of strategy.5 In 1946, Wesley set up the
Texas Conference for the Equalization of Educational Opportunities.
The Conference, which may well have existed almost exclusively on
paper, was said to be concerned with "prosecution of such cases as do not
come within the NAACP's non-segregation field.",6 That is, it was to
fight "on the segregated side" for equal though separate facilities.
Marshall expressed concern that if the Conference did not necessarily
duplicate the NAACP's efforts, it would "work . . . toward the
establishment of segregated educational facilities" and therefore "com-
pet[e] with the principles of the N.A.A.C.P."' 7 He said, "You just simply
cannot have a little segregation; you cannot rationalize on the necessity
of segregation at all."' Marshall concluded:
Every segregated elementary school, every segregated high school
and every segregated college unit is a monument to the perpetua-
tion of segregation. It is one thing to "take" segregation that is
forced upon you and it is another thing to ask for segregation. I still
believe that if the opposition finds that there are representative and
respectable Negroes who cannot be bought and who have standing,
who are in favor of segregation, then they will consider that as a
much better victory than any legal case that they can win against
US.
9
Wesley presented his case in a long letter of October 8, 1947. He
agreed that direct attacks on segregation were appropriate, but objected
to "making this an exclusive remedy."' Instead, equalization suits
should be brought; it did not "invite the establishment of segregated
schools.., to insist that those schools already established be equalized."" To
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. Letter from Robert Carter to Walter White (Nov. 4, 1946) (NAACP Legal Files,
1940-1955, Box 185, NAACP Papers, Library of Congress) [hereinafter cited as Legal
Files].
4. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Board of Public Instruction, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1945);
Turner v. Keefe, 50 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1943).
5. See D. HINE, BLACK VICTORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS
129 passim (1929).
6. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Carter Wesley (Oct. 25, 1946) (Box 213, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Letter from Carter Wesley to Thurgood Marshall (Oct. 8, 1947) (Box 213, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
ll1d.
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Wesley, "the NAACP is fooling itself" in thinking that a
direct attack will "knock down segregation at one fell swoop."12 Instead
a series of cases would be needed. Wesley pointed to the salary
equalization cases as models, and thought that Marshall could not
simultaneously support those cases and attack facilities equalization
suits. Wesley found no inconsistency between direct attacks in universi-
ty cases and equalization suits elsewhere. The latter simply accepted
the existing fact of segregation, without adopting it as a principle, and
sought to make "separate but equal" a reality. He concluded by noting
that the university suits had resulted, not in desegregation of existing
facilities, but in creating "shameful makeshift" 13 separate programs,
with no real equality. If such farces were to be avoided, equalization
suits had to be brought.
In Mt. Pleasant, Texas the whites are taking most of the money and
giving Negroes makeshifts in the form of inadequate buildings,
short school terms, no bus service, and no lunches. You know as
well as I that you aren't going to get a Negro with nerve enough, in
that mean East, Texas town, to sue to have his child go to a white
school. But you will get plaintiffs to sue to make their school equal,
because that follows the pattern that the white man himself has set
up.
1 4
Marshall's response came a week later: NAACP suits in elementary
and secondary cases point "out the inequalities" and seek an order that
would bar the school board from "denying to the Negro the equal
facilities furnished to the white student."' 5 He contrasted Wesley's
procedure as seeking a different form of relief, "the establishment of
equal facilities by raising the Negro school to the level of the white
school . ..."16
Our prayer for relief is to enjoin the Board from discriminating,
which would be answered, it seems to me, by either the admission
to the white school or the type of relief you request in your case.
Under these circumstances, is it not true that in our proceedings we
get either the type of relief in your case or the breaking down of
segregation and that in this type of case it is impossible to get less
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Carter Wesley (Oct. 16, 1947) (Box 213, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
16. Id.
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than we can get in your case, and at the same time, we would be
constantly hitting at segregation. If you agree with this, it seems to
me that we are then at the place where the only point of dispute on
this type of action is a difference in opinion as to procedure.'"
He acknowledged that there had been changes in the NAACP's
approach, a result of "a carefully worked out legal attack which we have
been working on for several years; . . . a realization that the procedure
formerly followed was not gaining the results we expected; and most
important, the terrific support for an all-out attack on segregation
through the people in Texas . . . ."1 The salary cases were not a
precedent for Wesley's approach, for there the issue was "not the school
but the race of the teacher," an issue applicable to mixed as well as
segregated systems.
19
Marshall's position, then, was that relief in the form of equalization
of facilities was subsumed under the request for an end to discrimina-
tion, and would be acceptable as a fall-back position. But he rejected
equalization as the sole form of relief to be sought, because that would
implicitly accept the position that segregated schools were legally
tolerable and could be made equal in fact. Marshall seems to have had
the better of the argument, and indeed it was later said that the basic
desegregation cases were developed in ways that "left all options open,"
and that "some of these cases look suspiciously akin to the old equality
approach with the direct challenge thrown in." But it was not just the
contest with Wesley for leadership in the black community that led
Marshall to tell the Texas Conference of Branches of the NAACP that
lilt no longer takes courage to fight for mere equality in a separate
school system,"2 ° and that the NAACP would not seek to enforce
segregation statutes.2 1 The reality of the litigation process meant that
the difference between equalization and the direct attack could not be
blurred once the cases moved past the stage of pleading, and it was
certain that, given a choice, school boards would equalize rather than
desegregate.
These ideological concerns were augmented by organizational
factors. Investigating inequalities, especially in systems where black
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Marshall, Statement to Texas State Conference of Branches (Sept. 5, 1947) (Box
110, Legal Files, supra note 3).
21. See generally J. GREENBERG, LITIGATION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: METIhODS, LIMITS AND
ROLE IN DEMOCRACY 16-19 (1974); Nabrit, Resort to the Courts as a Means of Eliminating
"Legalized" Segregation, 20 J. NEGRO ED. 460, 469 (1951).
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schools might be as good as white ones in some respects - for example,
by having been constructed more recently - but worse in others - for
example, in lacking laboratory facilities - was likely to be time-
consuming. The salary equalization cases had shown how serious a
drain on the NAACP's limited resources could be occasioned by drawn
out, heavily factual cases, and how difficult it was to use one fact-laden
case as a lever in securing victories in other cases. Marshall explored
these problems by arranging to pay a young Virginia lawyer, Spotts-
wood Robinson, for a one-year effort to establish a litigation program for
elementary and secondary schools. Most of Robinson's effort was devoted
to "getting things lined up for court action" by investigating, petitioning
school boards for general relief, and applying for admission to white
schools. When the year ended Robinson had explored the situation in
seventy-two districts, and had "active" cases at some stage in thirty-
eight. But by October 1950, three years after the program began,
Robinson reported that only three of fifty-one active cases were in court.
The reasons were obvious: as Robinson reported to Marshall in a
memorandum apparently solicited as part of Marshall's effort to
persuade doubters that the direct attack was preferable to equalization
litigation, the cost of a single equalization case in which only two
schools were compared was $5,000. Investigation required substantial
investments of attorney time and, as Robert Carter pointed out, while
equalization cases had to proceed school district by school district, the
direct attack would require only a single case for each jurisdiction. If, as
Marshall desired, a concentrated attack leading to real progress was to
occur, it would have to take the form of a direct attack; the NAACP
lacked the resources for any other course. 22
The national staff had been expanded, but this, instead of making
more attorneys available for the time-consuming equalization cases,
actually increased the pressures for the direct attack. The staff at first
consisted of Charles Hamilton Houston and Marshall. Houston resigned
as Special Counsel in 1939 and became the most important member in a
sort of "shadow" staff which conducted occasional investigations and
litigation. Typically Marshall supervised the investigation and did the
litigation himself. As he had before 1939, Marshall continued to handle
most of the salary equalization cases after he succeeded Houston in that
year. But for some time after 1939 Houston, though not formally on the
22. Letter from Spottswood Robinson to J. M. Tinsley (Oct. 1, 1947) (LDF Papers,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York) [hereinafter cited as LDF Papers; Letter from
Robinson to Thurgood Marshall (Oct. 2, 1947) (id.); Report of Legal Staff (Oct. 2, 1948)
(id.); Robinson, Report to Virginia Conference of-Branches (Oct. 21, 1950) (id.); Letter from
Spottswood Robinson to Thurgood Marshall (March 13, 1950) (id.); Carter to Robinson,
(April 5, 1951) (id.); Thurgood Marshall to A. C. Croft (Nov. 14, 1947) (id.).
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NAACP staff, litigated a number of important graduate school chal-
lenges. By the mid 1940's Houston's direct contributions to litigation
had substantially diminished, but his place was taken by a number of
salaried staff lawyers. The expansion of the staff, which included at
various times Milton Konvitz, Edward Dudley, Robert Carter, Marian
Wynn Perry, Franklin Williams, and Constance Baker Motley, allowed
Marshall to claim that "we are now in a position to broaden out our
legal program." The new attorneys, though, were all young North-
erners, inclined to favor the direct attack because of enthusiasm and
problems in appreciating fully the difficulties faced by blacks in the
South. Some of their impatience can be glimpsed in a memorandum
Carter wrote to Marshall in April 1948 after he had conferred with
Robinson in Virginia. Carter said that the only problem was "the old
[one] as to whether or not an all-out attack on segregation will be made
or whether counsel will be satisfied with a settlement which provides -for
steps toward equalization." He had told Robinson that a settlement
giving the schools time to equalize was probably inevitable; there were
not enough resources to pursue a direct attack. But he questioned the
typical request for relief, an order prohibiting further discrimination.
What this ultimately means is that a step by the school board to
equalize the educational opportunities for Negroes in a separate
school will normally be considered by the court as satisfaction of its
order. I do not believe, nor does Spotts, that we can be parties to a
consent to give the school board time to equalize. Our petition must
be that they are under an obligation to equalize instantly. However,
you realize, of course, that unless you attack these cases on the
ground that segregation itself is unlawful - and unless you refuse
to accept any settlement short of that - you are taking steps in
these cases which . . . are short of the goals which you have set
... . This has caused some confusion on Spotts part, but as I
stated above, my own feeling was that we do not have sufficient
funds to make the all-out attack on the elementary and high school
level.
Hence, I think Spotts must be left to use his own discretion as
to what compromise he will accept from the school board. I would
hate, however, to have anybody other than Spotts have this much
discretion. You and the national office will have to do some very
careful thinking on this proposition by the time you hold your
general education conference in order that there can be some
clear-cut, well-defined policy in this regard.23
23. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Walter White (Nov. 14, 1945) (Box 211, Legal
Files, supra note 3); interview with Robert L. Carter (Feb. 25, 1980); Letter from Robert
Carter to Thurgood Marshall (April 28, 1948) (Box 147, Legal Files, supra note 3).
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Though the pressures to attack segregation directly were strong,
they were partially offset by others. One was a diffuse sense that the
direct attack was premature; the NAACP had not, after all, secured a
major school decision from the Supreme Court since the Gaines case in
1938.24 More important, black teachers and principals, who had
provided major support for the litigation until then, were extremely
nervous about the direct attack strategy. Their sense of Southern mores
and some painful experiences had shown them that the jobs of all black
teachers, not just those of a few who took active part in litigation, were
threatened by the direct attack. They knew that Southern whites would
not tolerate a situation in which black teachers, especially men, taught
white children, especially girls. The threats did not materialize until
after the decision to pursue the direct attack was made, but by the end
of 1951 it was clear that these fears were "one of the greatest factors
contributing to opposition to integrating the public schools" within the
black community. In 1953, the superintendent of the Topeka schools
refused to renew the contract of a black teacher, because the Board
believed that "the majority of people in Topeka will not want to employ
negro teachers next year for white children." Earlier a branch member
whose wife was a teacher expressed concern that "in Kansas when such
cases are brought for integration of students . . . the Negro Teachers
are cut adrift without any consideration., 25
The most extensive discussions of threats to the jobs of black
teachers came in connection with a decision by white authorities to close
the black Louisville Municipal College when desegregation was ordered
in 1951. Many black teachers would be fired. The NAACP took a "very
avid interest" in the situation, because "we cannot hope to secure the
full-hearted support of the teaching faculty of Negro institutions in our
fight against segregation in educaion if the successful results of such a
fight will be the loss of jobs." The staff tried to allay fears by pointing to
experiences in New Jersey and Indiana, where no wholesale firings
occurred, and by developing legal strategies to challenge as discrimina-
tory the firing of black teachers in the course of desegregation. Dean
Charles Thompson of the Howard School of Education argued that there
would be no "wholesale dismissal" because there were not enough white
teachers to serve the combined school populations and because residen-
tial segregation would permit the continued employment of black
teachers in black neighborhood schools. But those associated with the
24. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
25. June Shagaloff to Marshall and Carter (Dec. 18, 1951) (LDF Papers, supra note
3); Wendell Godwin to Darla Buchanan (March 13, 1953) (id.); Earl T. Reynolds to Carter
(Sept. 25, 1951) (id.); McKinley Burnett to Carter (Sept. 30, 1951) (id.).
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campaign knew that remedies after dismissal were, in a practical sense,
of limited value, and that the threat of dismissal would be realized in
some places. Dean Thompson concluded that black teachers should
accept the sacrifices entailed by desegregation: "the elimination of
legally-enforced segregated schools should out-weigh in importance the
loss of teaching positions even by a majority of the 75,000 Negro
teachers who might conceivably be affected.
26
That response was available, though, only after the decision had
been made to seek desegregation rather than equalization. Because
black teachers as a class were not threatened with loss of jobs until that
decision was made, there is little indication in the documents that
actual threats affected the NAACP's decisions. But the members'
knowledge of the white South and the staff's understanding of the role
of black teachers in providing community leadership in the campaign to
that point made it inevitable that these problems would weigh heavily
against a direct attack decision.2 7 Marshall sometimes advocated a
"leave it to the defendants" strategy. But the same sophistication of
members and staff led them to understand that such a strategy was only
a fig-leaf for an underlying decision in favor of the equalization
approach.
These countervailing pressures could have resulted in organization-
al paralysis. It is true that the choice between equalization and direct
attack was postponed from 1945, when the issue surfaced, to 1950. But
the period was not one of paralysis. Rather, it gave Marshall the time to
use his skills with as much brilliance as the entire campaign saw. He
combined a consistent rhetorical commitment to the direct attack with a
conscious strategy of temporizing. The delays were used to prepare the
organization for the direct attack decision that Marshall preferred all
along.
In late 1945, Marshall expressed concern to Walter White about
''our inability to get cases started on the equalization of educational
opportunities in the South. 28 The lawyers were available, the cases
were important, and they were easy to win. He suggested that a
26. Carter to George Wilson et al. (Jan. 8, 1951) (LDF Papers, supra note 3); Carter to
Burnett (Oct. 1, 1951) (id.); Notes on Lawyers' Conference (June 15, 1951) (id.); see
Thompson, Editorial Comment: Negro Teachers and the Elimination of Segregated Schools,
20 J. NEGRO ED. 135 (1951); Greenberg, Racial Integration of Teachers - A Growing
Problem, 20 J. NEGRO ED. 584 (1951). See also Roland L. Dewing, Teacher Organizations
and Desegregation, 1954-1964 (1967) (Ph.D. dissertation, Ball State University, 20-27).
27. For a hint, see Nabrit, supra note 9, at 467 (noting "a considerable difference of
opinion" about the merits of the choice).
28. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Walter White (Oct. 24, 1945) (Box 110, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
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planning conference be held.29 The lawyers met in Atlanta in late April
1946, for an informal review of procedures. Although much of the
discussion focussed on the university cases, it did explore the general
theoretical problems entailed by seeking a general injunction rather
than the elimination of specific inequalities. 30 By the end of the year
Marshall was able to write Carl Murphy, publisher of the Baltimore
Afro-American, a letter that combined support for the direct attack with
reasons for delay: "Frankly, and confidentially, and just between the
two of us, there is serious doubt in the minds of most of us as to the
timing of an all-out attack on segregation per se in the present United
States Supreme Court. We are now working on the problem of having a
complete study made of the evil of segregation to demonstrate that there
is no such thing as 'separate but equal' in any governmental agency
... .When this is complete, it might then be possible to make an
all-out attack. However I do not know how long it will take to complete
this study . . .. ,, The letter shows how Marshall dealt with pressure
for the direct attack.
A long memorandum from Marshall to Roy Wilkins in 1947
demonstrates Marshall's personal commitment to the direct attack, and
shows that his hesitancy served the purpose of balancing pressures
within the NAACP:
I had assumed that the NAACP really meant business about an
all-out attack against segregation, especially in the public school
system. I had assumed that we not only realized that segregation
was an evil but had come to the conclusion that nothing can be
gained under the doctrine of "separate but equal." I had assumed
that the Board of Directors, as well as the branches and branch
officers, were in agreement on this. I had assumed that the
resolutions adopted at the Annual Conference and the beautiful
statements made at Board and staff meetings meant exactly what
they said. On this basis, we have proceeded to develop the legal
techniques for this all-out attack on segregation.
. . .[W]e propose to file these cases on the theory that facilities are
unequal and to request an injunction by the court to enjoin the
maintenance of the policy of discrimination. This will bring about
either equal facilities or the breaking down of segregation. All of
29. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to office (April 8, 1946) (Box 146, Legal Files,
supra note 3).
30. Digest of proceedings (Box 146, Legal Files, supra note 3).
31. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Carl Murphy (Dec. 20, 1946) (Box 114, Legal
Files id., supra note 3).
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this was explained in the memorandum on policy, which concludes
with the following . . . paragraph... :
Finally it must be pointed out that because of the reasons set out
above, the N.A.A.C.P. cannot take part in any legal proceeding
which seeks to enforce segregation statutes, which condones
segregation in public schools, or which admits the validity of these
statutes.
You will note from this procedure that the real difference is
that we do not any any place admit the validity of segregation
statutes and we do not call for the enforcement of these illegal
statutes.
* ' .I am beginning to doubt that our branch officers are fully
indoctrinated on the policy of the NAACP in being opposed to
segregation. It is therefore obvious that we need to educate our
branch officers and in turn the membership, and finally, the people
in the need for complete support in this "all-out attack on
segregation because it will be impossible for our branch officers to
do a good job unless we first sell them.32
The Board of Directors and the Annual Conference of the NAACP
endorsed Marshall's position in 1948. The Board stated, "it is our policy
that the N.A.A.C.P. will not undertake any case or cooperate in any
case which recognizes or purports to recognize the validity of segrega-
tion statutes or ordinances; the N.A.A.C.P. will likewise not participate
in any case which has as its direct purpose the establishment of
segregated public facilities., 33 The Conference "urge[d] the National
Office and the Branches to engage in a campaign to remove narrow
thinking within the ranks and eliminate any internal opposition to the
elimination of segregation."3 4 Spottswood Robinson reported on his
activities in Virginia to the lawyers' conference held in conjunction with
the 1948 Annual Conference. He noted uncertainty in the community
about "what they want. . .There were many, he stated, who had gone
no further than the question of a new Negro high school or accredited
elementary schools for Negroes."35 The complaints used the "leave it to
the defendant" form for relief. It was clear, though, that Robinson
preferred the direct attack. The next year the lawyers went to the
Annual Conference firmly supporting the direct attack. The National
Office had called the lawyers together to discuss how "to have all
32. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Roy Wilkins (Oct. 28, 1947) (Box 110, Legal
Files id., supra note 3).
33. Statement of Board of Directors (June 7, 1948) (Box 110, Legal Files, supra note
34. Id.
35. Id.
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governmental enforced segregation declared invalid ... 36 The
lawyers agreed that the cases should seek injunctions against discri-
mination and admission of blacks to white schools. They recommended
that the cases "in each instance should make a direct challenge of the
segregation statutes involved. 3 7
The staff had thus become committed to the direct attack rather
quickly. But no action followed from that commitment; the lawyers
rejected equalization as a remedy the NAACP should seek, but accepted
the practical equivalent of a "leave it to the defendants" relief in cases
that were actually filed.38 This would of course eliminate the pressures
from those who feared a direct attack. But it left the staff vulnerable to
attacks from two other directions. Those who like Carter Wesley
positively preferred equalization litigation saw nothing happening. To
them Marshall offered Robinson's exploratory survey as a reason for the
staff's failure to act. First the survey had to be completed, and its
results then showed how expensive the strategy would be. The other
source of pressure was the constituency that desired an immediate
direct attack. Marshall's letter to Carl Murphy gave one response, but
far more common were references to the pending university cases in
Texas and Oklahoma. For example, the Topeka branch of the NAACP
expressed interest in 1948 in starting a direct attack on segregation
there, believing that the schools were "physically substantially equal. 3 9
Marian Wynn Perry replied that the national staff would not handle the
case until the university cases reached the Supreme Court, "presenting
a picture from which it could be argued that inequality inevitably
results from segregation., 4' The most elaborate explanation was given
to the President of the North Carolina State Conference of Branches by
Edward Dudley:
[I]t is my impression that we would not be able to undertake any
additional university cases from this office until such time as some
of those presently pending are finally determined. I am sure you
realize that we must eventually reach the Supreme Court of the
United States on the question of segregation per se before we can
hope to fully break down this type of discrimination. One case can
do it, or even two, and, therefore, we do not feel that a large number
36. Resume of NAACP Legal Conference (June 21, 1948) (Box 11-42).
37. Id.
38. Report to Conference of NAACP Lawyers held in conjunction with the 40th
Annual Conference, New York City (June 23-25, 1949) (Box 11-44,).
39. Letter from Franklin Williams to Thurgood Marshall (Sept. 9, 1948) (LDF Papers,
supra note 3).
40. Perry to Benedict Wolf (Sept. 10, 1948 (id.).
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of cases should be taken to the Supreme Court at this time,
primarily because it is both financially and physically impossible
for this office to supervise these cases in all stages of appeal
properly. In spite of this, if the State Conference, through its Legal
Committee, desires to go forward with a case of its own in the lower
courts, particularly in jurisdictions wherein no facilities are avail-
able for Negroes, we have no objections and if the attorneys will
cooperate with this office by sending us a draft of their pleadings
before they are filed and other papers, we will be very happy to
check over same and advise them in accordance with procedures
being used throughout the country in similar cases.
As you know, our ultimate objective is to break down segregation as
we feel that there can be no equality in a segregated set-up. We are,
therefore, pitching our fight primarily on this issue. If the Supreme
Court of the United States, when our cases arrive there, is unable to
agree with us at this time, we can then fall back and rely upon the
"separate but equal" theory and file as many suits as we are
financially able to do so seeking to equalize every single facility
offered to the public by virtue of state monies. As stated above, this
does not close the door to action by the State Conference in
continuous cooperation with this office but it does suggest that
when certain cases are lost in the lower courts we may not be able
to take them up on appeal because of the number of cases presently
pending and the further fact that it only takes one good case to set a
precedent. 4
Marshall and the staff had thus bought time, during which they
could work out the the problems associated with the direct attack
strategy that they wanted to pursue, and persuade their constituency
that the course the staff preferred was the correct one to follow. They
were also able to take advantage of changes in the political climate
between 1945 and 1950. Blacks, North and South, formed an important
part of the New Deal coalition that was falling apart after the war.
Liberal Democrats, and Harry Truman, needed to solidify the support of
the black community. Truman established a Committee on Civil Rights,
whose 1947 report To Secure These Rights forthrightly called for "the
elimination of segregation . . . from American life." International
policy joined with domestic politics in the new atmosphere. In addition
to moral and economic reasons for eliminating discrimination, the
Committee gave an "international reason." Discrimination was "a
serious obstacle" to making the country "an enormous, positive
influence for peace and progress throughout the world."
41. Dudley to Kelly Alexander (Aug. 4, 1948) (Box 151, Legal Files, supra note 3).
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Those with competing philosophies have stressed - and shameless-
ly distorted - our shortcomings. . . . They have tried to prove our
democracy an empty fraud, and our nation a consistent oppressor of
underprivileged people . . . . The United States is not so strong,
the final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that
we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record.4 2
Shortly after To Secure These Rights was issued, Truman's Attorney-
General Tom Clark decided to file a brief supporting the NAACP's
position in cases then pending that challenged judicial enforcement of
racially restrictive housing covenants.43 Opponents of the direct attack
had been able to couple the fear of mass firings with a sense that the
direct attack was unlikely to succeed. By reducing the risk of failure,
these changes in the general political climate strengthened the position
of Marshall and the staff. The direct attack strategy, they could now
say, was not only right, it was likely to succeed.
The brief of the United States in the restrictive covenant cases had
another significant facet. Its legal argument was prefaced by a detailed
analysis of the implications of restrictive covenants as a matter of public
policy. While the policy analysis formally functioned to provide the
reasons for the government's participation in a lawsuit between private
parties,4" it also signalled the impact of Legal Realism on the process of
constitutional decision-making. One strand in the Realist movement in
the 1930's emphasized the importance for legal decisions of understand-
ing the actual operation of legal rules, and of selecting rules on the basis
of the social policies they promoted. 45 Howard Law School had been in
one sense a center for Realist thinking, but it existed outside the
intellectual core of academic law. During the New Deal, Realism
became a major intellectual movement in law. Recent graduates of law
schools brought to the post-war NAACP and Department of Justice the
conviction that the constitutional argument against segregation could
be keyed to facts and policy. Though analytical distinctions could be
drawn between, on the one hand, factual and policy analysis to inform
legislative choice or to uphold legislation as constitutional, and, on the
other, similar arguments to support a decision finding a practice
unconstitutional, intellectual currents do not always follow the lines
42. President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (Washington,
1947) at 166, 146-48.
43. See Kellogg, Civil Rights Consciousness in the 1940s, 42 TiIE HISTORIAN 19 (1979);
R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 253 (1975).
44. T. CLARK & P. PERLMAN, PREJUDICE ANI) PROPERTY 38 (1969) (reprinting the brief).
45. For an introduction, see Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979).
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that rational analysis would lay down. What came to be called the
sociological argument against segregation gained at least some of its
force as a legacy of Realism.
The NAACP had its first opportunity to use the sociological
argument in 1946. Mexican-American parents in Orange County,
California, had filed a lawsuit in March 1945, challenging the local
practice of segregating their children from those of whites. Neither they
nor their attorneys informed the NAACP of the original proceedings.
Although the NAACP "did not anticipate" the case, when the staff
learned of it they understood the opportunities it gave them. The trial
judge found the practice unconstitutional, and the school boards
appealed. The NAACP and other organizations filed briefs supporting
the parents. The NAACP relied heavily on the sociological argument,
drawing on published material detailing the harms caused by segrega-
tion per se. William Hastie, still serving as a counsellor to Marshall,
read the brief and wrote him that the argument must be developed
"fully with as little delay as possible. . . . The point is clearly
developed, but I believe we will be able to sustain it only when we make
an exhaustive investigation." He suggested using "people in the field of
education" to "assembl[e] and organiz[e] practically the entire body of
available material." He closed by noting that "there may come some
other case sooner than we anticipate in which we will have to make a
decisive fight upon this issue., 46 Because the NAACP was not a party to
the California case, it Was able to experiment with the sociological
argument at no cost whatever. Though the appeals court agreed that the
practices were unconstitutional, it neither adopted nor rejected the
sociological argument. The NAACP staff thus began to put the
argument into shape, suffered no defeat with implications for its own
cases, and expressed its commitment to the direct attack without
threatening its own constituency in the South.
As Hastie guessed, the sociological argument had to be put to work
sooner than Marshall expected. In early 1946 the NAACP prepared to
bring cases seeking the admission of black students to the state law schools
in Oklahoma and Texas, where no law schools for blacks had been estab-
lished. The authorities in Oklahoma were sufficiently antediluvian that
though the NAACP won its first education case in the Supreme Court since
Gaines, nothing came of the victory. The Texas authorities, though, were
surprisingly agile, and their maneuvers forced Marshall to work out the
details of the sociological argument under some pressure.
46. Letter from William Hastie to Thurgood Marshall (Oct. 25, 1946) (Box 111, Legal
Files, supra note 3); see C. WOLLENBERG, ALl. DELIBERATE SPEED: SEGREGATION AND
EXCLUSION IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS, 1855-1975, 108-35 (1976).
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From the beginning Marshall believed that he could have won the
Oklahoma case "in Mississippi. ' '4 7 Ada Lois Sipuel, the plaintiff, was a
strong-willed young woman who, though married, continued to use her
own name through most of the litigation. The case was attended at the
start with the usual delays, but the suit was filed in April 1946. In July the
state trial court dismissed the action, holding that a plaintiff could not use
mandamus to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, Sipuel appealed,
and one year after the lawsuit started, the state Supreme Court affirmed
the decision. It discovered some ambiguities in the NAACP's complaint,
briefs, and oral arguments, which led it to conclude that Sipuel did not
clearly seek admission to the white law school but might be satisfied if the
state established a separate but equal black school. However, the court
said, a demand on the state was required before it was compelled to set up a
black school. Although the NAACP sought review in the Supreme Court,
Marshall was not entirely happy when the Court agreed to hear the case.
Because the case had been disposed of without any evidence having been
heard, the record was so thin that a reversal of the state courts might
simply but, Marshall feared, openly reaffirm the "separate but equal"
doctrine. 4' He therefore took care to mount a direct attack on Plessy in his
brief to the Supreme Court; the Court might then treat the case as a simple
one but be scared away from relying directly on or reaffirming the "sepa-
rate but equal" rule.
On January 12, 1948, four days after argument, the Supreme Court
reversed the state courts.49 Its opinion consisted of three paragraphs, and
relied exclusively on Gaines. The NAACP's lawyers thought it significant,
though, that the court had decided the case so quickly and had directed
that its mandate, the document directing the lower courts to act on the
case, issue forthwith. Registration at the white law school was scheduled
for January 29, and the lawyers assumed that the Court wanted Sipuel
admitted. However, the state Supreme Court, in an opinion issued on
January 17, took the escape route that Gaines seemed to permit, and
directed the university authorities to open a "substantially equal" black
law school. Because of the Court's mandate, it seemed to the NAACP
lawyers that the black school had to open by January 29 too. That was
manifestly impossible, which meant, the lawyers decided, that the state
Supreme Court had blatantly defied the United States Supreme Court.
47. See generally Roscoe Dunjee to Marshall (Jan. 15, 1946) (Box 201, Legal Files,
supra note 3) for how the Oklahoma case was brought to Mr. Marshall's attention.
48. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to William R. Ming (Dec. 15, 1947) (Box 201,
Legal Files, supra note 3).
49. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). The procedural history is taken
from the record.
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Invoking the standard but rarely-employed procedure for challenging
directing evasions of the Court's mandates, they therefore filed a motion
for permission to file a petition for an order directing the Oklahoma
courts to comply with the original decision by ordering Sipuel's
admission to the white law school.5 ° But Marshall's earlier strategy now
turned back on him. The Court was unwilling to face challenges to the
"separate but equal" doctrine. It could avoid the issue if Sipuel had in
fact indicated her willingness to attend a separate school, for then the
issue of substantial equality would properly be explored by the state
trial court. Over two dissents, the Court rejected the NAACP's motion
on the ground that Marshall had not attacked "separate but equal" in
the state court nor, the opinion said, was that "an issue here" as the
case was submitted to it. 5 1 Oklahoma did open a law school for blacks,
and a trial on substantial equality was held later in 1948. In the
eighteen months the black school operated, one student attended. Sipuel
was admitted to the previously white school in August 1949.
Meanwhile the Texas law school case had moved to the center of the
NAACP's attention. At the end of January 1946, local NAACP officials
had located Heman Sweatt, a letter carrier who wanted to attend law
school.5 2 Although Sweatt had been graduated from an unaccredited
school, Marshall decided that it was worth proceeding on the chance
that the authorities would deny Sweatt's application on the ground of
race rather than qualifications.5 3 Theophilus Painter, the President of
the University of Texas, did just that,5 4 and the lawsuit was filed in
May, one month after Sipuel's case had been filed.
The development of the NAACP's litigation strategy in Sweatt v.
Painter can be understood only in light of the complex procedural
history of the case.55 Painter's letter denying admission to the white law
school in Austin informed Sweatt that he could demand that a black law
school be established.56 The trial judge agreed. Although he held that
the existing situation, in which blacks had no separate law school and
50. Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948). See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 245 (5th ed. 1978).
51. See Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision-Making in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1955, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1979).
52. Letter from W. J. Durham to Thurgood Marshall (Jan, 29, 1946) (Box 204, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
53. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to W. J. Durham (Jan. 30, 1946) (id.).
54. Letter from Painter to Herman Sweat (March 16, 1946) (Box 204, Legal Files,
supra note 3).
55. The procedural history is drawn from the record in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629, 631-32 (1950).
56. Letter from Painter to Sweatt (March 16, 1946) (Box 204, Legal Files, supra note
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could not attend the white one, violated the Constitution, he gave the
state six months to establish a black law school.57 Just before that
period expired, the state moved to dismiss Sweatt's complaint, present-
ing a resolution by the state's Board of Regents vowing to set up a
school in Houston. The trial judge held that the resolution satisfied the
Constitution, even though the school consisted at that time of two rooms
and one part-time instructor.5" The NAACP appealed, and the state
recognized how weak its position was. Instead of continuing to rely on
the obviously inadequate Houston school, the state shifted the school's
location and organization. Pending the creation of a full law school in
Houston, the black law school would be located in Austin.59 Three
rooms, sufficient to accommodate an expected enrollment of ten blacks,
were rented in a building across the street from the state Capitol. The
students, like other citizens of Texas, would have access to the state law
library in the Capitol. Several members of the faculty of the white law
school were to be the faculty of the black school, teaching there while
continuing their work up-town.60 The state and the NAACP agreed that
these changes, instituted in February and March 1947, changed the
facts on which the decision about substantial equality was to be based.
On March 26 the appeals court therefore reversed the judgment of the
trial court and sent the case down to be tried fully.6 1
The NAACP had six weeks to prepare for the trial. This time
constraint and the new factual posture of the case affected Marshall's
strategic decisions. At the outset the case seemed almost as straight-
forward as Sipuel's, and even the creation of the Houston makeshift
school injected only a simple element of proving the obvious physical
inequality between the black and white schools. The move to Austin
complicated the factual case and provided a real opportunity to use the
case for the broader purpose of attacking "separate but equal."
Conceptually, there were two stages in the NAACP's decisions. First,
Marshall had to decide how much to focus on the physical aspects of
inequality. As he developed the record, an honest but, fairly speaking,
rather weak case of physical inequality could be presented. The black
school was small, but on a per capita basis it provided equivalent floor
space to that given in the white school. Of course, the comparisons were
57. 339 U.S. at 631-32.
58. Id. at 632.
59. Letter from Durham to Thurgood Marshall (Nov. 30, 2946) (Box 204, Legal Files).
60. Letter from E. J. Mathews to Sweatt (March 3, 1947) (id.).
61. 339 U.S. at 632. While the NAACP's appeal to the United States Supreme Court
was pending, the black law school was moved back to Houston, where its facilities and
program satisfied the preliminary accreditation standards of the American Association of
Law Schools.
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based on the assumption that ten blacks would enroll, and because of
deep opposition in the black community to the state's strategy, only one
black actually enrolled.62 But that could hardly be attributed to the
state's failure to provide adequate physical facilities. The state law
library was not designed to accommodate use by students, but it had
essentially the same contents as the library at the white school. The
instructors in the black school did not teach full-time there, but they
were not part-time teachers. The undeniable differences between the
schools lay in their extracurricular, intangible aspects. These included
the absence of a law review and a moot court program at the black
school, and the inability of a school with a projected enrollment of ten to
support such activities. But once the attention shifted from physical
facilities and the formal program, it was easy to broaden the argument
to include all sorts of non-curricular differences between the schools:
reputation, opportunity for developing professional contacts, and so on.
And once those differences became relevant, the sociological argument
could be deployed fully. Thus, the manner in which Sweatt developed
made it seem easy and indeed perhaps necessary to attack Plessy. The
flaws the Court had found in the attempt to do so in Sipuel were
eliminated because Sweatt was in some ways a harder case, in which all
relevant arguments seemed appropriate and possibly essential.
The second stage in Sweatt followed almost inexorably once the case
had been broadened. If "separate but equal" was to be attacked using
the sociological argument, it made sense to attack it across the board,
not just for law schools or graduate education. Here the points about
reputation and professional contacts would serve only as specific
examples of the general harms that segregation imposed. Thus,
Marshall's approach in Sweatt would give the Supreme Court a choice.
It could follow the physical inequality route, for which there was some
evidence. If it did so, the NAACP would have lost nothing and gained a
little. But if the Court faced the record more honestly, and wanted to
rule in Sweatt's favor, it would have to recognize the significance of the
intangible aspects of education. Having done so, Marshall hoped, the
Court would be committed to moving further down the path that the
sociological argument provided.
But six weeks was an extremely short period in which to develop all
this. Marshall was not entirely happy about the prospects of a "wide
open" trial, although he understood the opportunity he was given. On
April 3, 1947, he wrote William Hastie and several other members of an
informal group of advisors seeking their help "in view of the fact that all
62. Letter from J. H. Morton to Thurgood Marshall (Sept. 26, 1947) (Box 205, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
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of the Negroes in the State of Texas, with the exception of Carter
Wesley, are determined to hit segregation ... 
So, whether we want it or not, we are now faced with the
proposition of going into the question of segregation as such. I think
we should do so because even if we don't take the case far, we at
least should experiment on the type of evidence which we may be
able to produce on this question. For example, we want to produce
experts such as Charlie Thompson to testify as to the inevitable
effects of segregation in per capita expenditures, etc. We are also
contemplating putting up Otto Kleinberg to testify as to the racial
characteristics not being present and other evils of segregation. We
are also contemplating putting on anthropologists to show that
there is no difference between folks.63
Hastie urged Marshall to be cautious. He apparently believed that
the issue of substantial equality would turn on physical and curricular
matters, where the NAACP's case was weakest:
While evidence on the consequences of segregation is made as
comprehensive as possible, I think it should lead to the narrower
point that at the graduate and professional level limited demand for
training and high per capita cost make discrimination in fact
inevitable. Certainly we cannot argue that segregation at the lower
levels is permissible. We should, however, give the court a basis for
distinguishing the general public school situation from the case at
hand. In that way at least an infinitesimal chance of winning the
law suit can be preserved.'
He also agreed that the NAACP might not take Sweatt to the
Supreme Court, but noted that "public pressure to carry the case as far
as possible will be tremendous. You might warn NAACP speakers
against uncautious predictions of what will be done in this litigation. '"65
But, consistent with his preference for the direct attack on
segregation, Marshall's enthusiasm was not to be dampened. After the
1948 trial on substantial equality in Sipuel, for example, he wrote
Erwin Griswold, Dean of Harvard Law School and a witness for the
NAACP at that trial, "Frankly, I am seriously worried that the Judge
will go off on the point of physical inequality and will completely dodge
63. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to William Hastie (April 3, 1947) (Box 204, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
64. Letter from William Hastie to Thurgood Marshall (April 9, 1947) (Box 204, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
65. Id.
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the segregation issue. 6 6 Griswold replied, "Of course I understand your
great desire to carry on the legal battle and to win a complete victory in
very short order."6 But, Griswold said, Sipuel was a good case on
inequality and a bad one on segregation, and he hoped that the judge
would indeed do what Marshall feared. "The thing to do with this case,
as I see it, is to win it. That will be a very great step forward. It will,
indeed, be one of the most important steps yet taken on the segregation
problem."6"
The time limitations in Sweatt led Marshall to pursue a dual
strategy. Because it was a law school case, he relied on experts in legal
education to testify in court about what substantial equality would be
and how it could not be reached in separate schools. The more general
points were made by presenting one witness, Robert Redfield, an
anthropologist, and by invoking social science research like Gunnar
Myrdal's American Dilemma, surveys published in the Journal of Negro
Education, and the Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights.
This made it possible to press the specifics on the court through direct
testimony and, perhaps more important, to coordinate the presentation
of the sociological argument in the limited time available.
The strategy succeeded, not in the Texas courts, which unsurpris-
ingly rejected Sweatt's claim, but in the United States Supreme Court.
Sweatt was accompanied by two other cases. In McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, a sixty-eight year old black educator seeking a doctorate
was admitted to the program at the white university but was required
to sit in a roped-off part of the classrooms and at special tables in the
library and cafeteria. 69 Henderson v. United States involved segregated
dining car service on a railroad regulated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. 70 In Sweatt and McLaurin the NAACP coupled the attack
on "separate but equal" with straight-forward inequality arguments. By
this time the sociological argument had been worked over repeatedly,
and the NAACP brief, though quite polished, contained little that was
new. Henderson was a different matter. In the lower courts the
government had argued that segregated service was not illegal under
the relevant statutes and not unconstitutional either. When the case
reached the Supreme Court, responsibility for representing the United
States shifted to Philip Perlman, the Solicitor General. Perlman had
66. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Erwin Griswold (June 7, 1948) (Box 202, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
67. Letter from Erwin Griswold to Thurgood Marshall (June 10, 1948) (id.).
68. Id.
69. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
70. 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
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signed the amicus brief in the restrictive covenant cases, and now
concluded that the government's position in Henderson was wrong. His
brief confessed error on the statutory issue and then urged that Plessy
be overruled. The arguments were the familiar ones, not significantly
different from those made by the NAACP. But they carried added
weight when the Solicitor General made them.
The Supreme Court was receptive to the attack on Plessy, though
outsiders other than Marshall would have been surprised to see what
the Justices were thinking about while the three cases were under
consideration. Justice Harold Burton's law clerks sent him a long
memorandum, with a cover note saying, "We think this is a good time
and a good case for reconsidering Plessy v. Ferguson." A later
memorandum to him in Sweatt relied centrally on the sociological
argument and referred, not to the NAACP's briefs, but to the Solicitor
General's brief in Henderson. Tom Clark, a Texan who had only
recently taken a seat on the Court, circulated a memorandum to the
entire Court in which he outlined his position. He thought that Plessy
had to be confronted, and would hold it inapplicable to graduate schools.
Established white schools had intangible assets like reputation, alumni
to provide professional contacts, better professors, and "a cross section of
the entire State . . . and, in the combat of ideas, . . . a greater variety
of minds, backgrounds and opinions. . . ." Chief Justice Fred Vinson
was skeptical about the Court's ability to draw a constitutional line
between graduate and elementary schools. Ultimately Vinson wrote the
opinions in Sweatt and McLaurin. Both held that the actual conditions
in Texas and Oklahoma did not provide blacks with an education
substantially equivalent to that available to whites. Thus the Court did
not directly face the questions of overruling Plessy or openly denying its
applicability to graduate education. 71
But the opinions laid the ground for future developments, of which
the Justices were acutely conscious. In describing the inequalities in
Sweatt the Court's opinion listed both the physical aspects and the
intangibles on which Clark and the NAACP had so heavily relied.
Given the discussions within the Court, invoking the intangibles
committed the Justices as much as any doctrine can to the position that
equality could not be achieved in separate graduate and professional
schools. And recognition of the relevance of intangibles opened the way
to adoption of the sociological argument. Judges concerned about
precedent could have drawn distinctions had they wanted to, but as the
nine men who made the decisions grappled with Sweatt and McLaurin,
they became convinced as individuals that, once they decided or were
71. For all the details, see Hutchinson, supra note 51.
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forced to face the issue, they would overrule Plessy. As Clark had
concluded in his memorandum, "If some say this undermines Plessy
then let it fall, as have many Nineteenth Century oracles."
72
Marshall had lived with the attack on segregated education all his
professional life. When he read the opinions in Sweatt and McLaurin he
understood what the Justices had done when they chose to rely on
intangibles. One week after the decisions were announced, he wrote one
of his law school expert witnesses, "All three of the decisions [including
Henderson] are replete with road markings telling us where to go
next."7 3 He believed that the law had reached a turn in the road. But
though the decision turned out to be relatively painless, it was not
inevitable that the NAACP would follow the logic of the Court's
opinions to the direct attack. Sweatt and McLaurin did not affect the
prospective costs and gains to the organization in any obvious way.
Having pursued the cases and having won on extraordinarily far-
reaching grounds, the NAACP might have been embarrassed had it
gone back to an equalization approach in elementary and secondary
education. Yet the increased prospects for success in a direct attack also
signalled increased threats to black teachers. In cost-benefit terms
Sweatt and McLaurin ought not to have affected the calculus greatly.
But it is important to remember that the staff had always preferred the
direct attack. The strategy of temporizing mattered for two reasons.
Again to use the terms of cost-benefit analysis, an organization's
expected gains and losses from a decision must be estimated before the
decision is made. Delaying a decision may improve the ability to make
an accurate estimate, as more resources are invested in the process of
estimation. Marshall had spent five years educating his constituency on
the issues of equalization versus direct attack, and almost certainly
made the membership more aware of exactly what was at stake. When,
at the end, Sweatt and McLaurin were decided, the staff could also use
the increased likelihood of success as a method of focusing attention on
a careful assessment of costs and benefits. In 1945 uncertainties in the
evaluation of costs and benefits made it unclear to the NAACP's
membership that the direct attack promised a positive payoff; in 1950
greater precision developed in the interim showed that the payoff would
be positive. The direct attack had crossed a threshold because of the
time spent in educating the NAACP's membership.
Three weeks after Sweatt and McLaurin were decided, Marshall
convened a conference of lawyers to map "the legal machinery for
72. Id. at 22.
73. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Charles Bunn (June 12, 1950) (Box 206, Legal
Files, supra note 3).
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dealing the last blow to segregation."7 4 The conference developed a
resolution, adopted in July 1950 by the NAACP Board of Directors,
stating that all future education cases would seek "education on a
non-segregated basis and that no relief other than that will be
acceptable. . . ."Recently some have suggested that Marshall remained
cautious even in 1950. There is no documentary evidence for that
suggestion. Marshall's caution ran from 1945 to June 5, 1950, when
Sweatt and McLaurin were decided.7 5 "Caution" was, it seems fair to
conclude, not based on Marshall's assessment of what changes in the
law could reasonably be expected during that period, but on his
assessment of the needs of the NAACP and its various constituencies.
Marshall preferred the direct attack from the start. But he put off the
decision from a time when it would have seriously split the NAACP to a
time when the external environment, in politics and legal doctrine, and
the internal politics of the organization made it easier for others to
agree that what Marshall wanted was in their interest too.
During this phase of the campaign against school segregation,
Marshall's various skills as a lawyer were employed to great effect. His
judgment enabled the NAACP to develop the sociological argument in
appropriate contexts, and it informed his understanding of the meaning
of the way in which the opinions in Sweatt and McLaurin were written.
But in my view Marshall's greatest skill was political: by strategies of
delay ranging from the commission to Spottswood Robinson to the
reference to the pending university cases, he was able to reconcile
internal differences among his and the NAACP's diverse constituencies.
By 1950 the decision to attack segregation in elementary and secondary
schools directly, which five years earlier would have been controversial
and divisive, was, from the constituencies' point of view, inevitable and
unifying. It is hard to identify anyone in the NAACP during that period
other than Thurgood Marshall who chould have pulled it off.
74. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to Lem Graves (July 5, 1950) (Box 206, Legal
Files).
75. R. KLUGER, supra note 43 at 290-94.
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